Which Note Apps Actually Encrypt Your Notes End-to-End? A Claims-vs-Docs Audit (2026)

Read the security doc, not the homepage badge. At-rest encryption means the vendor holds the keys and can decrypt your notes — or hand them over on a legal demand. End-to-end means only you hold the key. Many note apps that advertise "encrypted" are the former, and their own documentation says so.

This audit does one thing: it reads each vendor's current security page and separates three claims that marketing tends to blur. End-to-end means only you and the people you share with can read a note; the company cannot. At-rest means the note is scrambled on the vendor's disks, but the vendor keeps the key. In-transit means it is encrypted only while it travels the network. Eight note apps are covered below, sourced entirely to their own documentation as read on 2026-07-25. Nothing here is a leaderboard or a "most secure app" verdict — those are the wrong question. The right question is narrow and answerable: who holds the key to your notes, and does the doc admit it?

What does "end-to-end encrypted" actually promise?

End-to-end encryption means only the people holding the keys — you, and anyone you share with — can read the data; the service provider cannot. At-rest encryption is weaker: the data is scrambled on the vendor's disks, but the vendor keeps the keys, so it can decrypt on demand.

The two words are marketed as if they were the same guarantee. They are not.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation states the distinction plainly in its Surveillance Self-Defense guide: "End-to-end encryption tools make messages unreadable to eavesdroppers on the network, as well as to service providers themselves."¹ That last clause is the whole game. At-rest encryption protects your notes from a stolen disk or a careless breach. End-to-end encryption protects them from the company you are paying — and from anyone who can compel that company.

For a note app, the consequence is concrete. If the vendor holds the key, a subpoena, a rogue employee, or a data breach can expose your notes. If only you hold the key, the company has nothing readable to hand over. Everything below is an attempt to find out which apps are which, using their words, not their badges.

The gap between the badge and the doc: Obsidian

Obsidian Sync is end-to-end encrypted by default — and Obsidian's own documentation is more honest than any badge. It says the app does not encrypt your local vault, that some sync metadata stays readable by its server, and that a "Standard" option exists where Obsidian holds the key and could decrypt your notes on a legal request.

All three admissions come from the same security page, which is exactly why the page beats the badge.

On default end-to-end Sync, Obsidian's doc is unambiguous: "Obsidian cannot read your notes. The encryption key is derived from your password and never transmitted."² That is a genuine end-to-end claim, precisely scoped.

The precision cuts both ways. The same page describes a "Standard encryption" option in which "Obsidian holds the encryption key. Your data is protected in transit and at rest, but could be decrypted by Obsidian (for example, in response to a legal request)."² Choose that option and you are back to at-rest. Two further caveats round out the honesty: Obsidian's documentation notes that it does not encrypt your local vault at all, and that some sync metadata — which device uploaded or deleted a file, when it happened, and the mapping between encrypted file paths and content — stays readable by the server.² A badge cannot carry that nuance. The doc does, and that is exactly why you read the doc.

Which note apps are end-to-end encrypted by default?

Three apps in this audit turn end-to-end encryption on by default: Standard Notes, Notesnook, and Obsidian's remote Sync vault. In each, the vendor's documentation states that encryption happens on your device with a key derived from your password, so the company cannot read your notes without your credentials.

Standard Notes is the most explicit. Its help center says your notes are "encrypted using XChaCha20-Poly1305, one of the strongest forms of encryption available," strengthened by "a password-stretching algorithm called Argon2."³ "Strongest" is Standard Notes' word, not a verdict this audit endorses — but the operational claim is checkable: "no one, including us, has tampered with your data. The entirety of the encryption and decryption process happens completely offline."³

Notesnook markets itself as an "Open source & zero knowledge private note taking app" with "End-to-end encrypted note syncing."⁴ "Zero knowledge" is Notesnook's own marketing language — an absolute this audit quotes as a vendor claim rather than adopts as fact. Its homepage names XChaCha20 and Argon2 as the cipher and key-derivation function, though its deeper technical documentation was not reachable at audit time, so treat the exact primitives as the vendor's stated design rather than an independently audited spec.

Which apps make you turn end-to-end encryption on?

Two apps can be end-to-end encrypted, but are not until you act. Joplin's end-to-end encryption is opt-in and off by default — you must enable it on one device first. Apple Notes is end-to-end encrypted only if you switch on Advanced Data Protection; under the default "standard" setting, Apple holds the keys and can assist with recovery.

Joplin's documentation defines the goal well: end-to-end encryption "prevents potential eavesdroppers - including telecom providers, internet providers, and even the developers of Joplin from being able to access the data. The system is designed to defeat any attempts at surveillance."⁵ The catch is the default. Joplin's encryption "needs to be manually enabled on a single device first," so an untouched install syncs without it. Joplin points to a separate specification for the exact cipher; this audit confirms the policy verbatim but does not restate the primitive as an audited number.

Apple draws the line just as clearly. Under the default, "Standard data protection is the default setting for your account. Your iCloud data is encrypted, the encryption keys are secured in Apple data centers so we can help you with data recovery."⁶ Only "if you choose to enable Advanced Data Protection" do "your trusted devices retain sole access to the encryption keys for the majority of your iCloud data, thereby protecting it using end-to-end encryption."⁶ Default Apple Notes is at-rest; end-to-end is a setting you have to find.

Which note apps encrypt only at rest?

Notion and Evernote encrypt your notes at rest and in transit, but not end-to-end — both hold the keys by design. That is a legitimate trade-off, not a failure: server-side keys are what let these apps search across a workspace, collaborate in real time, and recover a locked-out account. It also means the vendor can decrypt, and can be compelled to.

Notion's security page states it plainly: "Customer data is encrypted at rest using AES-256. Customer data is encrypted when on Notion's internal networks, at rest in Cloud storage, database tables, and backups," and "Data sent in-transit is encrypted using TLS 1.2 or greater."⁷ Strong, standard, server-side encryption — with Notion holding the keys. There is no end-to-end claim on the page because there is no end-to-end feature.

Evernote is the same shape. Its security overview says the service will "encrypt all data at rest using AES-256, transparently and automatically" — Evernote's data sits on Google Cloud — and that "all secrets are encrypted both at rest and in transit."⁸ Read literally, that protects your notes from a stolen disk and a network eavesdropper. It does not protect them from Evernote. Neither app is doing anything wrong by advertising "encryption"; they are simply describing at-rest encryption, and the honest reader should hear it as such.

The audit, side by side

Here is the same evidence in one table. Each cell is the vendor's own current documentation, read on 2026-07-25 — not a homepage badge and not a score. The only column that settles the "can they hand my notes over" question is who holds the keys.

The cipher column is included because a claim is only as good as the primitive behind it.

Three apps default to end-to-end (Standard Notes, Notesnook, Obsidian Sync). Two are end-to-end only after you turn it on (Joplin, Apple Notes with ADP). Two are at-rest by design (Notion, Evernote), as is Apple Notes under its default. And one — Skiff — is a cautionary blank row.

Why "most encrypted" isn't the whole question

The strongest encryption is worthless if the app disappears. Skiff was a genuinely end-to-end encrypted note and email suite — and in 2024 it was acquired and wound down. Encryption protects your notes from outsiders; portability and plain files protect them from the vendor's own mortality. Both matter, and they are different guarantees.

Skiff's own landing page recorded the ending: "Skiff has joined Notion. On Feb 9th, we announced that Skiff was acquired by Notion and that services would be sunset on August 9th."⁹ A product that ranked among the most private note tools available simply stopped existing, taking its encrypted store with it. This is the durability axis, and it is covered at length in our companion piece on note apps that outlive the company. The lesson pairs cleanly with the encryption lesson: end-to-end encryption answers "who can read this," while an open, exportable format answers "will I still have this." A tool that is strong on the first and weak on the second is only half safe. That trade-off is one facet of what local-first actually means once you audit the claim rather than the slogan.

Who should insist on end-to-end encryption — and who shouldn't need to?

If your threat model includes the vendor itself — subpoenas, breaches, a company that reads what it stores — insist on end-to-end encryption where only you hold the key. If you mostly want protection from a stolen laptop or a careless cloud, at-rest encryption from a reputable vendor is a reasonable, honest choice.

The mistake is not picking at-rest; it is thinking you picked end-to-end when the doc says otherwise.

Insist on end-to-end (only-you-hold-the-key) if you:

• Keep notes a subpoena or civil-discovery request could reach — legal, medical, journalistic, or financial material.
• Want the company itself outside your threat boundary, not just outside attackers.
• Are comfortable that you, not the vendor, are responsible for not losing your password — there is no recovery if only you hold the key.

At-rest encryption is a fair choice if you:

• Value cross-device search, real-time collaboration, and account recovery more than shielding notes from the vendor.
• Trust a reputable provider's operational security against outside breaches.
• Keep nothing you would mind the company being able to read or being compelled to produce.

How to audit a note app's encryption yourself

Skip the homepage. Open the security or privacy doc and answer four questions: Is it encrypted at rest, end-to-end, or both? Who holds the key? What metadata stays readable? And is it on by default or opt-in? Privacy claims are legally enforceable representations, so the doc is the promise — the badge is marketing.

The reason this discipline matters is precedent. In 2024 the U.S. Federal Trade Commission ordered the antivirus maker Avast to stop selling browsing data and to pay consumer redress, after finding its "privacy protection" and "anonymized" marketing misrepresented what the software actually did.¹⁰ The gap between the copy and the code is precisely what regulators and a crypto-literate audience attack — which is why an honest security page under-claims rather than over-claims.

Apply the same discipline to any tool you use, including this one. MNMNOTE, for instance, keeps your notes as plain Markdown on your own device and offers end-to-end encrypted sharing — the shared text is encrypted on your device before it leaves, and, holding to the scope this audit demands of everyone, the honest caveats belong in the open: the people you share with hold the keys, and any AI feature you opt into sends the text you choose to your chosen provider. A capability is only worth as much as the threat model printed next to it.

Frequently asked questions

These are the questions people actually type when they start wondering whether their note app can read what they wrote. The short answer to most is the same: check who holds the key, and read it in the vendor's own doc rather than on the marketing page.

Is Notion end-to-end encrypted? No. Notion encrypts customer data at rest with AES-256 and in transit with TLS 1.2 or greater, but it holds the keys — there is no end-to-end feature.⁷ That server-side model is what enables workspace search, sharing, and account recovery. It also means Notion can decrypt your content and can be compelled to produce it.

Are Evernote notes encrypted? Yes, but at rest, not end-to-end. Evernote's security overview says it encrypts "all data at rest using AES-256, transparently and automatically" and that data is encrypted in transit as well.⁸ Evernote (and the Google Cloud infrastructure it runs on) holds the keys, so the encryption protects against outside breaches, not against the vendor itself.

Is Obsidian end-to-end encrypted? Obsidian Sync is end-to-end encrypted by default, using AES-256-GCM with a key derived from your password: "Obsidian cannot read your notes."² Two honest caveats from Obsidian's own doc: your local vault is not encrypted, and a "Standard" option exists where Obsidian holds the key and "could be decrypted by Obsidian" on a legal request.²

Are Apple Notes end-to-end encrypted? Only if you turn on Advanced Data Protection. Under Apple's default "standard data protection," your iCloud data is encrypted but "the encryption keys are secured in Apple data centers" for recovery.⁶ With Advanced Data Protection on, "your trusted devices retain sole access to the encryption keys," making it end-to-end.⁶

What is the difference between at-rest and end-to-end encryption? At-rest encryption scrambles data on the vendor's storage, but the vendor keeps the keys and can decrypt on demand. End-to-end encryption keeps the keys with you, so the provider cannot read the content — the EFF notes end-to-end makes messages "unreadable... to service providers themselves."¹ For notes, that is the difference between "can be subpoenaed" and "nothing readable to hand over."

Can my note app be subpoenaed for my notes? If it is at-rest-only, the vendor can decrypt your notes and can be compelled to produce them. Obsidian's own doc says its non-end-to-end option means data "could be decrypted by Obsidian (for example, in response to a legal request)."² If only you hold the key, the vendor has nothing readable to give — that is the practical payoff of end-to-end.

The badge is a promise the company makes to itself. The doc is the promise it makes to you. When your notes are the thing being protected, read the second one.

MNMNOTE keeps your notes as plain Markdown on your own device and shares them with end-to-end encryption — you can open a tab and start writing at mnmnote.com.